RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy Reorganization-Right to Set off under §77 of the Bankruptcy Act[Federal].-The trustee of a railway corporation which had filed a petition under § 77
of the Bankruptcy Act sued to recover the amount of the railway corporation's bank
deposit. The defendant bank attempted to set off bonds of the corporation which it
owned. Held, since reorganization proceedings themselves do not accelerate unmatured obligations the bonds were not mature and the bank was not entitled to set
off. Set off of unmatured debts will not be allowed unless the debtor is insolvent and
it appears that liquidation rather than reorganization will ensue. Lowden v. Northwestern Bank and Trust Co., 84 F. (2d) 847 (C.C.A. 8th 1936); certioraridenied, 57
Sup. Ct. io9 (1936).

Although no case as yet has held that reorganization proceedings themselves accelerate unmatured debts, the court might easily have found that the bonds were accelerated. § 77n provides that unless it would be inconsistent with the provisions of
§ 77, the rights of the creditors shall be the same as if there had been an adjudication
of bankruptcy on the day when the petition under § 77 was filed. 47 Stat. 1481 (1933);
ii U.S.C.A. § 205 (1) (1935). The majority rule is that a petition in bankruptcy which
results in adjudication accelerates unmatured claims. In re PortageRubber Co., 296 F.
289 (C.C.A. 6th 1924); Central Trust Co. of Ill. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S.
581 (igx6). Similarly, a petition for reorganization might also be held to accelerate
unmatured debts. The fact that unmatured claims are provable under § 77 would
render questionable a finding that the application of the bankruptcy rule of acceleration would be inconsistent with § 77 since the provability of a debt rather than its
maturity should determine whether it can be set off.
The more interesting question raised by the court's opinion is whether § 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act is inconsistent with the provisions of § 77 and hence inapplicable
under § 77n. See 47 Stat. 1481 (1933); 11 U.S.C.A. § 205 (1) (1935). The allowance of
set off may be considered inconsistent with the purpose of § 77 because it will reduce
the amount of cash at the disposal of the reorganized enterprise and hinder its rerehabilitation. Such a reduction of cash may have a more undesirable effect than the
reduction of assets caused by the allowance of set off in liquidation proceedings because it may defeat not only the interest of creditors in equal distribution, but it may
also defeat or endanger the interest of the enterpriser and the community in having
the failing enterprise reorganized. Security interests, however, are protected under
§ 77 although they indirectly reduce the available cash by reducing the amount of
property that can be used as security for new loans. Thus, complete disregard of the
right of set off is hardly justified by the fact that its exercise will reduce the amount of
cash. Moreover, set off was allowed in equity receivership proceedings out of which
proceedings under § 77 developed. Central Appalachian Co. v. Buchanan, go Fed. 454
(C.C.A. 6th 1898); Clark, Receivers § 661 (1921). The equity practice in this regard
might well be followed since it is not clear that it is modified by § 77.
Perhaps the decision was prompted in part by a conviction that set off as ad-
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ministered in bankruptcy proceedings is socially undesirable. The chief justification
of set off would seem to be that the creditor has relied on the debt owed by him as
security for the debt owing to him. See Hawkins v. Freeman, 2 Eq. Abr. io, pl. o
(1723); cf. Glenn, Liquidation § 544 (1935). But the existence of any reliance is questionable and even when it is present, several objections may be advanced against the
recognition of set off in insolvency proceedings. It is a secret security device not
easily discoverable by other creditors. When it is resorted to by a bank creditor from
which a debtor may withdraw his deposits at will, it resembles other security devices
which have been stricken down on the ground that the debtor has reserved excessive
domination over the security. Cf. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). These
objections may justify a change in the Bankruptcy Act. In the absence of such a
change, however, a complete disregard of the right of set off in proceedings under § 77
is justifiable only as an attempt to whittle away at a bad rule.
It is possible that the claims of a creditor with a right to set off will not be completely disregarded even though the trustee is permitted to collect the debtor's chose.
The court may stay the enforcement of liens and mortgages. 47 Stat. 1474, 1481
(1933) , 11 U.S.C.A. § 205(a), 205(j) (1935); Continental Illinois National Bank v.
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1934). Staying the enforcement of the security, however, does not mean that preferential treatment will not be given to the
secured creditors in the reorganization plan. Similarly, here it is possible to treat the
debt owed by the creditor as security and to deny set off when the trustee seeks to
collect the debt and yet, in effect, to allow it by giving the creditor special protection
in the plan. Such an arrangement would give some recognition to the right of set off
without reducing the amount of cash immediately available for the use of the reorganized enterprise.

Bills and Notes-Insanity as Defense to Indorser against Holder in Due Course[Federal].-During a Florida real estate boom, the defendant payee indorsed a note
to the plaintiff in payment for real estate bought by the defendant and subsequently
sold by him. When the note became due the maker defaulted and the security had become worthless. In this action the defendant alleged that he was afflicted with manicdepressive insanity, and that at the time of the assignment he was in the manic phase,
which tended to make his hopes for future profit from the transaction inordinately
rosy. Held, the defendant can not escape liability. The plaintiff did not know of the
insanity. The deal was consummated at what was then a fair valuation of the property.
There were no facts-considering the premises-which should have led the plaintiff to
question the defendant's sanity. Beale v. Gibaud, 15 F. Supp. 1020 (N.Y. 1936).
The decision that an insane person can not avoid liability under a contract, where
restoration of the status quo is impossible, unless the bargain was unfair or the other
party acted in bad faith or with knowledge or notice represents in this case a successful
reconciliation between two conflicting policies: the one, that of protecting a holder in
due course of commercial paper; the other, that of protecting an insane contractor.
These two policies have had an independent development and have frequently been in
conflict. The present resolution of the conflict gives as much protection as possible to
the holder in due course without depriving the insane assignor of any necessary safeguard.

